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(Article 7)
The Ancient Doctrine of
Trespass to Web Sites
I. Trotter Hardy"

[Cite as: I. Trotter Hardy,
The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites,
1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7, par.
.]

Abstract
(par. 1) The common law action of trespass to real property
served to establish and preserve the very notion of "property"
in land. Many of the words used to describe Web sites have a
basis in real property: the word "site" itself is one, as are such
expressions as "home" pages, "visiting" Web sites, "traveling"
to a site and the like. This usage suggests that the trespass
action might appropriately be applied to Web sites as well.
The question is not academic, for the "obvious" protections—
technology and copyright law— may not work. That analogies
to real property trespass can be made does not suggest,
however, that they should be made. The fundamental issue is
whether the treatment of Web sites as property makes sense in
light of the justifications for the institution of property

1 Copyright 1996 I. Trotter Hardy. Professor Hardy teaches at the William & Mary
School of Law in Williamsburg, Virginia, and can be reached at
<thardy@facstaff.wm.edu >. Please note that Professor Hardy is also the editor of

the Journal of Online Law

and has, perhaps embarrassingly, taken
advantage of that position to select his own article for publication in his own
journal. Any inference that selection of this article for release in JOL is a mark of
any particular level of quality should therefore not be drawn. On the other hand,

he notes that "I started this journal, dammit, and what's the point of having your own
journal if you can't once in a while publish your own article in it."
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generally. Four strands of property theory —Locke's natural
rights, Bentham's utilitarianism, Hardin's "tragedy of the
commons," and Radin's "property as personhood" — turn out
to yield strong justifications for treating Web sites as property
and hence for the application to them of the common law of
trespass.

Introduction
(par. 2) Tens of thousands, if not millions, of computers can
now be accessed over the Internet Much of that access lately
has been through software packages known as "browsers,"
such as Netscape, Mosaic, the Internet Explorer, and others
provided by commercial services such as America Online and
Prodigy. With these "browser'' software tools, owners of
computers on the Internet can put specially formatted
documents onto their computer. Anyone anywhere else on
the Internet can then gain access to and read the documents.
These documents can contain "pointers" to other such
documents on other computers. The user of the browser
software can then "travel" from document to document in
cyberspace, looking at and reading from places that may be
thousands of miles apart
(par. 3) The first "page" or screenful of information in such
documents is usually called the "home page." The totality of
these documents and the means of accessing them is often
called the "World Wide Web," or "WWW" or sometimes just
"the Web." Conventionally each computer-plus-document
combination is known as a "site" on the Web. The use of
browsing software to access these sites is often referred to as
"visiting" or "traveling" to the site. Like the term "cyberspace"
itself, the terms "site," "visit," and "travel" draw explicitly on
a physical metaphor that "cyberspace" and the Web are
physical locations that a computer user can "go to" to get
information. The physical metaphor raises a number of
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interesting questions, 2 among them this intriguing legal issue:
does the common law of trespass apply to "sites" in
cyberspace?
{par. 4) At first blush, there would seem to be no need for a
legal action to enforce one's "property" rights to a Web site.
Technical means are available. The site owner can set a limit
on the total number of such users, thereby enforcing a "first
come, first served" priority scheme. The owner can also, with
sufficient technical facility, limit accessing users to certain
Internet addresses, or prevent access for certain addresses, or
effect combinations of both approaches.
{par. 5) But perhaps the owner does not prefer such
schemes. For one thing, they require technical intervention
that may be beyond the capacity of the owner. A commercial
Internet provider, for example, might provide a means for its
customers to establish an individual home page, but might not
choose to provide the technical assistance that would enable
technical access restrictions. For that matter, not all classes of
users can be unequivocally identified by their address. Nearly
all university addresses end in ".edu," for example, whether
they are publicly or privately funded. Suppose a site owner
chose to limit access to public university students and faculty.
A restriction based on Internet address would simply not
suffice to effect this limitation, even if it were offered.
{par. 6) Why should the legal system not provide the
owner a flexible choice of schemes in order to effectuate such a
limitation if the owner desires it? The trespass action could be
one means of providing that limitation; it could be tailored as
flexibly as language allows, for the owner would simply
describe the desired access restrictions on the site's home page.
To be sure, identifying "trespassers" would often be difficult,

2 The implications of viewing "cyberspace" as a kind of "space" are many, they are
well explored in M. Ethan Katsh, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995).
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if not as a practical matter impossible. But it will not always be
impossible. Moreover, the knowledge that the legal system
endorses a scheme of access restrictions analogous to those for
real property, with an analogous action in trespass to enforce
it, might be a sufficient deterrent for law-abiding citizens. That
might be enough for an owner.

The shortcomings of copyright explained
{par. 7} Commonly today issues of information access are
addressed, in the United States in any event, as questions of
copyright law. Even momentary instances of information
within a computer's memory have been found to be "copies"
for purposes of that law. 3 Current proposals such as that from
the Commerce Department's Working Group on Intellectual
Property regarding copyright in the age of the Internet 4dont
suggest any other outcome. But the use of copyright for brief
accesses to information strikes some commentators as either
awkward or ill-advised. 5 Indeed, it has recently been
questioned by other courts 6 and led to proposed legislation

3 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9 th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994); Advanced Computer Services v. MAI Systems

Corp., 845 F.Supp. 356, 362-4 (E.D.Va. 1994); Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 699118 (U.S. Feb.
26, 1996); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §5.2.1.
4 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights ("White Paper"), 1995.
5

See, e.g., David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles: The Evanescent Copy,
May 1995, at 103.

THE

AMERICAN LAWYER,
6

See DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, 95-10850, (5 th Cir. 1996).

7
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that would broaden the right to create copies in computer
memory.?
(par. 8) Moreover, even the Commerce Department
Working Group, which has given the issue perhaps the most
extensive and public scrutiny received to date, focused on
defining the rights of copyright owners to "display" and (as
proposed, to) "transmit" copyrighted works. The White Paper
makes it quite clear, for example, that an unauthorized posting
of copyrighted information on one's computer would infringe
the owner's rights of public display, and possibly even the
right of transmission. The proposal does not make clear,
however, whether an authorized posting coupled with an
unauthorized access to that same information would infringe
any of the owner's rights. In any event, the legislation
introduced to enact the White Paper proposals 8 has, as of this
writing, stalled and will apparently not be enacted in the 1996
calendar year.9
(par. 9) Copyright therefore is still of uncertain application
in some crucial situations. In others, it does not apply under
the most generous interpretations and proposals — those are
the situations in which the material posted to a Web site is not
copyrighted at all. Many Web sites already post information
that is not copyrighted because it is in the "public domain."
Among such sites are those that offer information authored by
the Federal Government, such as agency documents, manuals,

See "Bill Introduced to Allow ISOs to Use Software Copies," 12 THE COMPUTER
LAWYER (February, 1995) at p. 33 ("Rep. Joe Knollenberg (R-Mich.) introduced a bill
on Jan. 17 that would amend 17 U.S.C. §117 to overturn the principle set forth in MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc. and ACS v. MAI Systems Corp.").
8 "The National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act," S. 1284, 104 th

st Sess. (1995).
9 See Mark Walsh, "Impasse Over Online Copyrights: Why a proposed bill is
polarizing the Internet's two biggest industries," The Recorder, May 9, 1996, at pl.

Cong.,l
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and the like, and those that offer court opinions and
legislation."

The issue of preemption of trespass by copyright
disposed
{par. 10) One might think that a trespass action, however
desirable or not in the abstract, would be a moot point in
practice because it would be preempted by the copyright law's
"preemption provision." That provision, section 301 of the
Copyright Act, preempts any state law, including presumably
an action for common law trespass, in certain instances: When
a state law provides rights that are "equivalent" to those
provided by the Copyright Act, and provides them for subject
matter that is also the subject matter of the Copyright Act, then
section 301 declares that the state law is preempted—leaving
copyright to govern the issue.
{par. 11) At first glance, the state common law of trespass,
if used to control access to information, would seem to be just
the sort of law that section 301 would preempt It would be no
argument to the contrary, for instance, that the information at
issue was in the public domain. The argument here would be
that since such information is not copyrightable, the copyright
act cannot preempt any attempt under state law to protect it.
To the contrary, the copyright policies of furthering
information access are at their maximum strength when
otherwise copyrightable information has entered the public
domain. A state law that directly precluded copying or

I ° See, e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court opinions at Cornell University's Legal
Information Institute server, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/supct.table.html>; the
Constitution of Virginia, put up by the Virginia General Assembly at
<http://www.state.va.us/dlas/generali/ctoc.htm>; and the Georgia Court of Appeals
rules of procedure, at <http://www.State.Ga.US/Courts/Supreme/carules.htm>; and the
Americans With Disabilities Act, part of Villanova University's Center for Information
Law and Policy, <http://www. law. vill.edu/legis/ada/ada-toc.htm>.
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distributing such information would quickly be preempted on
the grounds that the rights being sought were identical to
those provided by copyright; and the subject matter at issue—
public domain material—was indeed well within copyright's
subject matter, but simply not currently protected by
copyright. 11
{par.12) But at least three other, more subtle arguments,
suggest that preemption might not apply to a trespass action
used to restrict access to a Web site. First, in a literal-minded
way, when a trespass action is used, the right at issue would
be the right to control the reading of information—not its
reproduction, distribution, performance, etc. It is those latter
rights, not that of "reading," that are the rights of an author
established by the Copyright Act. If state law restricted
reading, at least arguably such a right would not conflict with
the copyright rights of reproduction, display, and so on,
because the act's list of author's rights does not include the
exclusive right to "read."
{par. 13} On the other hand, a closer look at what goes on
when one "browses" a Web suggests that "reading" an
electronic document does bring about the physical fact of
"copying." A document on a Web site that is read by a remote
user can only be read because the accessing software creates a
"copy" of the document in the memory of the user's computer.
As noted above, there is substantial authority that even
temporary instances of copyrightable works in computer
memory are "copies." If such temporary instances are
conclusively "copies" for copyright purposes, then quite
possible a trespass action would be preempted.
{par. 14) But the trespass issue is well worth considering,
for the notion that temporary instantiation in RAM is a "copy"
remains controversial. It may not be tightly adhered to by

11

See

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT

at §1 5.2.3.
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courts, and it may well be overturned legislatively. Should the
Copyright Act be revised to make clear that such momentary
fixations do not constitute "copying," then the right to control
such fixations would no longer be a copyright right In that
event, copyright's preemption doctrine would be inapplicable
if a common law trespass action were brought to control access
to a Web site.
[par. 15) Consequently, the issue of preemption of a
trespass action remains a significant open question, and the
arguments for such an ancient common law action remain of
substantial—if not vital—importance in this high-technology
world of networked Web sites.

An illustrative problem defined
{par. 16} To illustrate this issue, imagine the following
scenario—based loosely on fact Smith & Jones, a law firm in
the United States, has put a document of information about
law, including some government information that is in the
public domain, on its Internet-connect computer. In other
words, it has created its own home page on the Web.
[par. 17) This home page specifies that anyone on the
Internet may browse through the document and look at any
and all information — anyone, that is, except anyone who is
using a commercial computer service that charges by the
minute for access. Such people are advised that they may not
read beyond the home page screen. No technical restrictions
are put into place; users are simply told: "If you are paying a
per minute charge for Internet access, you are not allowed to
read any further." Smith & Jones has its own reasons for
doing this: they relate to the firm's desire not to be a vehicle
for someone else's profit making.
(par. 18) Now suppose that a user named Carol has gained
access to Smith & Jones's home page and read but ignored the
note there. As a matter of fact, Carol has continued to read the
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Smith & Jones document well beyond what the notice allows
her to do. If Smith & Jones learns of this access, can they
successfully sue Carol for common law trespass?

The basic law of trespass to land set out
{par. 19) The Restatement of Torts defines the common law
cause of action for "trespass" as follows:
One is subject to liability to another for trespass,
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any
legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or
causes a thing or a third person to do so, or
(b) remains on the land, or
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is
under a duty to remove. 12

{par. 20) Obviously the first obstacle to adopting this
principle to Web sites in cyberspace is precisely that such sites
are not physical property. But the first two Restatement
elements fit surprisingly well: it is not hard to imagine that an
unwanted Web visitor "enters [a Web site] in the possession of
the other," or that the unwanted visitor "remains on the [Web
site]" without permission.
{par. 21) Of course, a simple semantic argument that one is
able to interpret the Restatement's language in this way is not
a powerful argument that it should be so interpreted. A deeper
analysis of the policies and purposes of the trespass action is
called for.
{par. 22) Broadly speaking, the tort of trespass to land
exists to protect private property by vindicating the owner's

12 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965).
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interest in exclusive possession of the land. 13 The need to
vindicate that interest is what leads most courts to hold that
actual damage in the legal sense of "harm" need not be proved
in a trespass action. To look beyond the superficial similarities
between real property and a Web site, we therefore need to
look into the reasons that legal systems provide protection for
private property, and that implies a need to look at the
theories underlying the very institution of private property
itself.

Four property theories sketched and applied
to Web sites
(par. 23) A thorough investigation of the theory of
property would take us far into a fascinating literature—much
farther than is possible in a short essay like this one.
Fortunately, no more than a summary of some key theories
will suffice for our purposes.

Locke—Labor-desert
(par. 24) John Locke justified the institution of property in
a few simple logical steps: First, everyone has a property right
in their own bodies and in their own labor. Second, all the
resources of the world are given by God to humanity in
common. Third, when anyone mixes his labor with resources
held in common, the mixture of his own labor is the reason for
the rise of a property right in the resources that were mixed
with the labor. Finally, this right must be limited: one has a
right to the resources with which one has mixed one's labor,

13 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163, Comment d (1965) ("The wrong for which
a [trespass] remedy is given ... consists of an interference with the possessor's interest
in excluding others from the land. Consequently, even a harmless entry or remaining, if
intentional, is a trespass. This is true even though the possessor benefits from the
trespass, ...").
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but only to the extent that carving out an individual property
right leaves enough resources, of as good a quality, for
others."
{par. 25) Many of Locke's examples were of the addition
of labor to the cultivation or production of goods directly from
natural resources: bread, wine, and cloth were examples of
labor-produced goods that he contrasted with the naturallyoccurring acorns, water, and leaves. But he espoused the
notion that when labor created property in resources, those
resources (their property right) could then be transferred to
another for further processing, transferred again, and again,
yielding a property right in goods that may have passed
through many hands and steps in the fabrication process.
{par. 26) Locke's formulation has been immensely
influential in the thinking of later philosophers of property.
But we need not linger on its contribution or correctness more
than to note that the essential "labor-desert" component of his
theory easily justifies the institution of property rights in Web
sites. Notice that with such sites, their value and even their
existence derive entirely from someone's labor in setting up
the site. Locke assumed that uncultivated land had some value
(though a tenth or hundredth of its value when cultivated),
but the addition of labor was itself enough to create a property
interest. Far more with Web sites, for without the labor and
skill to create such a site, there is no "Web site" at all. Someone
had to process the natural resources of copper, petroleum,
silicon, and so on to produce wires, plastics, and computer
chips; others labored to create software; others combined these
to create a Web site.
{par. 27) Moreover, one of the harder aspects to justify of
Locke's theory is the requirement that when one "incloses"

14 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, chapter V, pares. 25-36,
reprinted in C.B. MACPHERSON, EDITOR, PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL
POSITIONS 17-21 (1978).
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common property and with labor, makes it one's own, one
must leave "enough, and as good" of the resources for others.
Locke himself had no difficulty with this limitation because he
conceived of a world of enormous surplus: huge tracts of land,
endless rivers. "No Body could think himself injur'd by the
drinking of another Man, though he took a good Draught," he
explained, "who had a whole River of the same Water left him
to quench his thirst."15
(par. 28) One can quarrel with this expansive view as
applied to many forms of property, but it works as Locke
imagined for Web sites. Indeed, the marvelous thing about the
WWW is that there is no technical reason that every human
being could not have his or her own Web site— a home page
for Everyman. Perhaps one day this "expansive" view will
seem as naive (or not) as Locke's view, but for the present it
appears perfectly true.
(par. 29) In any event, the Lockean "labor" theory of
property and its "enough, and as good" restriction, readily
justify the treatment of Web sites as a form of property.
Bentham—utilitarianism
(par. 30) Philosopher Jeremy Bentham justified the
institution of private property on utilitarian grounds. He did
not agree that anyone had any Lockean natural right to the
ownership of property, but he concluded that the state should
create such a right because it was advantageous to society to
do so. When the state does not create and protect private
property, this lack leads to four evils: first, that people are
deprived of the pleasure of ownership; second, that one
experiences pain on losing something that is otherwise a part
of one's hopes and expectations; third, that fear of losing what
one currently owns causes insecurity and inability to "relax

15 LOCKE,

para. 33 quoted in MACPHERSON at 20.
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and enjoy" what one currently owns; and fourth, that the
knowledge of the possibility of future ownership provides an
incentive to labor. 16
(par. 31) Some of these rationales seem a bit circular: how
can one suffer the pain of loss of ownership or a sense of
insecurity about impending loss of ownership if one has no
expectation of a right of ownership in the first place? But
Bentham was concerned that absent a law of property,
individuals would by to use technological means (locks, guns,
fences, etc.) to protect what they had amassed. It would be this
sense of technological ownership that would be subject to a
sense of insecurity because superior technological force could
always overcome it. Legal protection would provide the
security and sense of ownership that these technological
means could not provide.
(par. 32) These four rationales offer limited, but certainly
not trivial, support for treating Web sites as property. Anyone
who labors over the creation of such a site would have an
expectation of ownership. If it were important to such a person
that others access parts of the site and not others, the law's
protection of that expectation would preserve the creator's
"pleasure" of ownership and exclusive control. In the same
way, presumably a Web site creator might be said to
experience some form of emotional pain if others could defeat
the owner's desires to control access.
(par. 33) Perhaps this seems silly, but let's put it in context-.
most Web site owners do not want to restrict access to their
sites. To the contrary, they prefer to encourage others to visit.
For these people, the law's recognition of a private property
right in the form of a trespass action would simply be
irrelevant they would not seek to invoke it. But as we noted in
the opening hypothetical about the law firm and its public

16

Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 70-71 (Oceana Pubs. 1975).
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domain material, others might seek to restrict access for their
own good — or for silly or pointless — reasons. These are the
people who will feel the pain—however great or small— of
loss of the ability to control access to their site. Similarly, these
are the people who will feel whatever insecurity attaches to
the lack of any legal enforcement mechanism for controlling
access and who, correspondingly, will be benefited by a
private property right in their Web sites.
{par. 34) To be sure, these various rationales, all centering
on emotional pain and insecurity, seem attenuated when
plucked from their tangible property origins and applied to
more intangible "properties" like Web sites. But we ought not
be too quick to conclude that Bentham's concerns are
irrelevant or trivialized when applied in the latter context
Indeed, it would be patronizing to assume that no reasonable
person could experience pain in the face of an unauthorized
access to a "home page." Perhaps it is no accident that people
are so fond of the term "home page:" it invokes strong
emotional feelings. For that matter, anyone who has
experienced a physical break-in of their home understands in
a way that others cannot just how strong is the emotional sense
of insecurity and helplessness that results. We should hesitate,
then, before dismissing Bentham's first three, "pain"
rationales, as they apply in cyberspace.
{par. 35) Moreover, Bentham's fourth rationale, that
knowledge of the possibility of future ownership of property
provides of the necessary incentive to labor to create or
improve that property. Far more straightforwardly than the
others, this rationale directly applies to the creation and
improvement of intangible property. Indeed, the rationale
underlies the notion of copyright and patent laws. Those laws
exist to provide an incentive for the creation of works of
authorship and technology, exactly as Bentham described for
tangible property.
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(par. 36) Would a recognition of private property rights in
Web sites provide an incentive to the creation of such sites?
We may debate the degree and frequency with which
individuals would experience this incentive, but there is no
question that property ownership would indeed provide some
incentive. Again, it is essential that we keep our focus on the
individuals who are within the scope of our concern. For
those, perhaps many, individuals who want as much access to
their sites as possible and who have no desire to bring a
trespass action, the knowledge of a possible property right to
exclude others does not provide an incentive. Neither is it an
impediment, of course: it is simply irrelevant.
(par. 37) But we are not here concerned with those
individuals; rather we are concerned with those who do have
some desire to exclude. For these latter individuals, the
knowledge of property rights would certainly serve as an
incentive. They would be freer to create a site with limited
access, such as the law firm site.

Hardin—tragedy of the commons
(par. 38) One of the most common justifications for private
property is its alternative: the "tragedy of the commons." 17
Thisutlarneoyxpisrtbnoghawe
all members of a society have equal rights to all property, they
will tend to overuse it. Imagine that every individual owns a
cow and wants to graze that cow on the group-held property,
the "commons." No individual has any incentive to limit the
grazing of his own animals, for each is in a "prisoner's
dilemma" vis-a-vis the other members of society. Lees take
individual "Alice" who owns cattle. Alice has to decide

17 Garett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (December 13,
1968), as cited in DAVID W. BARNES AND LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
Law AND ECONOMICS 28 (1992).
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whether to restrain her cattle so as not to eat all the grass or to
let them graze "full speed ahead," and perhaps thereby injure
other members of the society whose cattle may not find
enough to survive.
{par. 39} What makes the situation a prisoner's dilemma is
that Alice's best strategy is invariant under any assumptions
about what those other members of the society may do. If they
hold back their cattle, Alice stands to gain by letting hers run
free. On the other hand, if they let their cattle run free, Alice
will only be hurting herself if she does not do the same. Each
member of the society would view matters the same way and
face identical incentives: to let their cattle run free and graze as
much as possible. There will be no incentive to hold back and
conserve grass for the future needs of the society.
Consequently, without other limitations, the society will tend
to overuse the commons and take little heed for conservation
for the future.
{par. 40) Converting the commons from group ownership
to private ownership converts the externalities of each
individual's behavior the overgrazing into an internal cost:
one the owner will feel. A private property owner will
therefore have greater incentives to manage grazing wisely
with an eye toward maximizing long-term gains through
conservation.
{par. 41) Does this same rationale apply to Web sites? To
answer that question we need to understand the technical
nature of a Web site. Such a site is "usable" by more than one
individual at a time. This result flows from the nature of the
Internet as a packet switched network. Some networks, like
the telephone network, operate on the basis of a dedicated
channel of communication that is established at the outset of a
call and preserved until the call is finished. For dedicated
channel communications, once a channel is in operation, no
other users can communicate over it. That is why the
telephone network features the "busy" signal: a signal that a
—

—
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channel over which one wishes to communicate has already
been dedicated to another's use and is therefore unavailable.
(par. 42) Packet-switched networks, in contrast, have no
dedicated channel. Rather, communications are broken up into
small parcels called "packets." These packets are routed over
different physical channels on an ad hoc basis. One packet
may take an entirely different path from start point to end
point than another packet that is part of the same
communications session.
(par. 43) A consequence of packet switching, as this
process is called, is that the receiving computer receives a
communications session in discrete pieces, a packet at a time.
In turn, that means that as long as each packet is properly
identified, the receiving computer can receive packets from
different sources, each part of a different communications
session, without the different sessions conflicting. And that
means that a given Web site can serve as a host for more than
one user at a time.
{par. 44} In a sense, that makes a Web site something like a
"public good," as is "information" generally. Public goods are
goods that exhibit "non-rivalrous consumption." That is, one
consumer can make use of the good without preventing or
impeding another user from doing the same thing at the same
time. In practical terms, this means that one person's reading a
book does not stop anybody else from reading another copy of
the same book.
(par. 45) The idea of resources being wasted through the
tragedy of the commons is based on the commons being a
private good: something the use of which by one individual
does prevent another individual from the same simultaneous
use. If the use of a Web site by one person does not impede
others' simultaneous use, then the argument for granting such
sites the status of private property is weakened.
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(par. 46) In fact, Web sites are not completely public
goods. The use by one person consumes some of the host
computer's resources, resulting in ever so slightly less of those
resources available at that instant for other users. For small
numbers of users on common Web host computer systems,
each user will experience no noticeable delay from the
presence of the other users. But as more and more users
attempt to access the same site, eventually delays will become
noticeable. For some smaller machines this might happen at
about 25 users; larger machines might not experience any
significant delays until 50 or more simultaneous users. But it is
obvious that each user does indeed consume some of the host
computer's computational resources. A Web site is, therefore,
not a perfectly public good; rather it is a kind of semi-public or
semi-private good—one that exhibits no noticeable rivalry in
consumption over some low level of use, but that becomes
noticeably rivalrous as use passes some threshold point.
[par. 47) Because consumption is rivalrous at some point, a
Web site owner might well desire some priority scheme to
prevent overloading. The default scheme of service does not
accomplish the control necessary to prevent a slow down. For
once the number of simultaneous users reaches the point that
the computer cannot effortlessly keep up with their demands,
service begins to slow for all users, no matter when they first
connected to the site.
(par. 48) To the extent, then, that sites evidence at least a
low level of rivalrous consumption, it makes sense to allow the
site owner a means of limiting access to what is, in effect, a
limited resource. Trespass, as the legal enforcement
mechanism that undergirds the establishment of private
property in land, is therefore a suitable action.
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Radin—personality
{par. 49} Professor Margaret Jane Radin has offered an
intriguing view of property theory by suggesting that
property rights in some item "X" might vary in proportion to
the strength of one's personal attachment to or investment in
"X."18 The notion is that an individual's ability to achieve a
sense of "personhood" is often bound up with things over
which the individual asserts or would choose to assert some
sort of ownership interest Objects such as wedding rings,
houses, family pictures, and the like are not simply fungible
commodities but things that make human beings what they
are. Under Radin's view, things with a stronger attachment to
one's person might command a higher degree of property-like
protection than purely fungible items like dollar bills.
{par. 50} Radin's theory is intriguing; more to the point, it
offers strong support for the notion that a Web site should be
considered property, at least those sites that are set up by
individuals primarily for the sake of their expressive qualities.
Many Web home pages today are indeed the product of
individual, not corporate and not commercial, effort. Home
pages have personality; they reflect the idiosyncrasies of their
owners. They are the '90's equivalent the expressive tee shirt,
only if anything more expressive because far more customized
for each owner. One certainly senses from viewing many of
these "home grown" home pages that their owners take great
pride in their pages, that they use the pages to make a
statement about themselves. To use Radin's phrase, such home
pages "are closely bound up with personhood because they
are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing

18

See Margaret Jane Radin,

(1982).

Property and Personhood,
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personal entities in the world." 19 Certainly in the "world" of
cyberspace, home pages are often the principal if not the only
way that many people "constitute themselves as continuing
entities."
(par. 51) Not all such pages will experience the same
degree of personal self-expression, of course. Presumably
corporate Web pages will have fewer—perhaps no—personal
attributes." But even here, a corporate "personality" of a sort
is often expressed by a Web page. Such things as trademarks,
familiar and colorful graphics, a style of presentation, and the
like can often be seen on corporate, commercial Web pages. It
takes no great stretch of the imagination to conceive these
pages as reflecting a corporate self-expression.
{par. 52} One does not have to agree with the latter
observation, however, to find in the notion of "property for
personhood" at least a strong strand of support for viewing
Web pages as a kind of property. If Web pages are only bound
up with individual personhood for many individuals, then at
least for those individuals the legal system would be justified
under Radin's view in recognizing a property interest in such
pages. That such property recognition might be bet ter
grounded for individuals than corporate entities does not
argue against the fundamental proposition: that a Web page is
worthy of recognition by the legal rule against trespasses.

19

Radin, note 18, at 959.

20 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 12 (1993) ("Corporations
are normally not conceptualized as having collective identities in any cultural sense. It
follows that business entities, as long as we conceive of them as rational economic
actors, can only hold fungible property.")
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Conclusion
(par. 53} The notion that a cause of action for "trespass to
Web sites" should exist as a means of enforcing control over
access to Web sites may seem strange. But many things about
the Web are strange, at least compared to pre-Web technology;
it should not surprise us if legal developments might seem
comparably strange at first
[par. 54) Copyright law might seem the more obvious way
to establish "rights" over one's own Web site, since
copyrightable information is often at issue. But copyright law
suffers from several disadvantages. First, it seems a stretch of
reasoning to make copyright apply to a "visit" to a Web site.
Copyright, after all, is most at home with multiple
reproductions or performances of individual works of
authorship—not with Web reading and browsing. Viewed
afresh, without knowledge of current case law, a trespass
action is actually a more straightforward and intuitively
sensible means of controlling access to "sites" than is a
copyright one.
}par. 55} Second, there is mixed authority on the copyright
point though some courts have held or implied that a Web
"visit" might result in an infringing "copy" of a work of
authorship, other cases have implied the contrary.
Consequently, it may turn out that copyright simply does not
work in the site visit situation, so that a consideration of
trespass as an alternative is much to the point
[par. 56) Third, there is some sense in the copyright
community that copyright ought not to apply to Web site
visits. if this sense is translated into legislation, Congress will
itself rule out copyright as a means of controlling site access,
and again, consideration of a trespass action is in order.
(par. 57} Trespass actions are grounded in the idea of
protecting an owner's control over real property. But real

~
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property is just a particular species of "property." There is no
inherent reason that a Web site could not be considered a
species of "property." The institution of property can itself be
justified by several different jurisprudential theories, including
those of Locke, Bentham, Hardin, and Raclin. Each of these
theories offers surprisingly strong support for treating a Web
site as "property," and accordingly, for allowing a common
law cause of action for "trespass to Web sites."
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